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Introduction
1 The concept of human dignity assumes many forms in constitutional discourse. It is
often  referred  to  as  being  the  philosophical  basis  of  human  rights1.  Some  modern
constitutions declare it as their supreme principle and/or fundamental value2. It is also
not  uncommon  that  human  dignity  is  understood  and  protected  either  as  a
constitutional right on its own or by way of other constitutional rights3.
2 Though its legal status is almost universally accepted as of utmost importance, there is
little agreement on its content – both in theory and in practice. Dignity is an essentially
contested concept4. Implications of this lack of definitional consensus are particularly
evident  in  constitutional  adjudication  with  courts  invoking  the  notion  of  human
dignity in their decision-making. National constitutional courts or other courts of last
instance, in their capacity as the highest guardians of constitutional (human) rights5,
are  often the  ones  responsible for  determining the  concept’s  content  and scope of
application.  This  view  of  dignity  as  the  basis  of  human  rights  and/or  as  the
fundamental constitutional principle prevails in many new democracies, such as, and
including, Slovenia6. 
3 This article explores how the concept of human dignity is perceived and applied in the
case-law of the Slovenian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: the Constitutional Court or
the Court). It focuses on the Court’s recent case in which human dignity was applied as
a  litmus  test  of  constitutionality  of  an  authoritative  act.  The  Court  held  that  a
municipal ordinance naming a street after Josip Broz Tito, the president of the former
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Socialist  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  (SFRY),  was  unconstitutional  since  the
symbolism attached to the name Tito can objectively be understood as recognition and
glorification of the former non-democratic regime he led. According to the Court, such
action  on  the  part  of  public  authorities  is  contrary  to  the  principle  of  respect  for
human dignity whose foundation lies in Article 1 of the Constitution that establishes
the Republic of Slovenia as a democratic republic.
4 This decision is of particular interest for two reasons: one, it marks the first time that
the concept of human dignity was invoked as an independent principle and the main
argument in the Court’s decision-making process; two, with this decision, the Court
established that human dignity is an essential element of the principle of democracy.
5 The article proceeds in the following way: first, a detailed presentation of the case facts
and of the Court’s reasoning is given. A brief excursion offering an insight into the
German Constitutional Court’s understanding of human dignity serves to demonstrate
the influences on the Slovenian Constitutional  Court’s  approach to this  issue.  After
that,  the  Court’s  discourse  on  human  dignity  leading  up  to  the  Tito  Street case is
presented. Finally, a two-fold criticism of the Court’s decision is offered.
 
Facts of the case
6 The case was brought before the Court by a group of four petitioners, claiming that
their right to personal dignity7 had been violated by the naming of a street after Josip
Broz Tito, who, in their opinion, personified the communist regime of the former SFRY.
In addition, they asserted violation of Article 63 of the Constitution8. According to the
petitioners, this provision protects constitutionally guaranteed categories of equality,
human dignity and a democratic state governed by the rule of law: values that are in
stark contradiction to those fostered in the former totalitarian regime.
7 The petitioners  argued that  Josip  Broz  Tito  personally  supervised  and dictated  the
development of the communist regime9. They claimed that, historically looking, he was
a negative persona, an anti-democrat and a dictator and that naming the street after
him  therefore  entails  a  particular  kind  of  incitement  to  hatred  and  violence.  The
contested  ordinance  in  consequence  once  again  humiliates  those  who  have  been
unjustifiably marginalized in the former regime due to their political convictions.
8 The petitioners also called attention to several domestic and international documents
which declare the non-democratic nature of totalitarian regimes of the latter part of
the 20th century10,  thus adding weight to the claimed incompatibility between those
regimes and the values fostered by contemporary democratic regimes.
9 The  opposing  party  (the  City  Municipality  of  Ljubljana)  primarily  contested  the
petitioners’  legal  interest  (i.e.  standing)  to  initiate  proceedings  for  the  review  of
constitutionality of the ordinance. It argued that only individuals with permanent or
temporary residence in the area to which the changes (i.e.  the new naming) relate
demonstrate  such  legal  interest.  Secondly,  they  objected  to  the  alleged
unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The municipality argued that the disputed street
was named after Tito in recognition of his historic importance for the Slovenian people
and their state. As commander-in-chief of the Partisan army he led the 1945 liberation
of present-day Slovenia from fascist occupation. Numerous commendations that Josip
Broz Tito received from foreign states, as well as the fact that many cities around the
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world named public facilities after him testify to his great historical role. In conclusion,
they added that although discussions on naming streets can be a matter of democratic




10 Based on the arguments set forth by the parties, the Court was faced with having to
address  two  separate  yet  related  problems.  First,  they  had  to  decide  whether  the
petitioners demonstrated legal interest in the initiation of the procedure for the review
of constitutionality of the ordinance11. Second, they had to determine whether Article 2
of the ordinance, determining the name of the new street, was inconsistent with the
principle of respect for human dignity, i.e. whether the naming of the street after Josip
Broz Tito violated the petitioners’ constitutional rights.
11 Hereupon I focus on the second problem, i.e.  the purported violation of the human
dignity principle. With regard to the matter of legal interest, the Court first established
that the naming of streets has a direct effect in relation to all public and private legal
subjects in their daily lives and business activities. Second, claiming that the case at
hand  raised  questions  concerning  human  dignity  and  thus  matters  of  the  greatest
importance for democratic rule12, the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, who had
formally been recognized the status of a former political  prisoner,  did demonstrate
legal interest, since rehabilitation after human rights violations that occurred in the
totalitarian regime was an essential  element of  that petitioner’s  legal  status13.  With
that, the Court found no reason to rule on the legal interest of other petitioners and
proceeded to decide the case on merits.
 
Violation of human dignity
12 The  Court  initially  argued  that  « [r]espect  for  human  dignity  is  the  legal-ethical
foundation of contemporary states based on the concept of constitutional democracy,
i.e. on the presumption that authority must be restricted by certain fundamental rights
and freedoms humans are entitled to due to their inherent worth14. » With time, most
prominently after World War II, the principle of respect for human dignity had come to
be widely recognized as « a special  universal  principle » within the most important
international human rights documents15,  as well as « the fundamental constitutional
principle in the constitutions of new democracies, which, by codifying human rights,
placed  the  individual  at  the  centre  of  the  constitutional  order16 ».  The  Republic  of
Slovenia  is  among those  new democracies  who have embraced this  view of  human
dignity. Its founding (independence) documents convey the country’s commitment to
the protection of fundamental human rights17. It is on the basis of these documents that
the Court developed the understanding that « human dignity is the fundamental value
which permeates the entire legal order18 » and for that reason objectively influences all
acts of public authorities. Substantively, it « entails the presumption that every human
being has equal and absolute inner worth because he or she is a human being. Respect
for  human  dignity  therefore  entails  the  protection  of  the  inherent  worth  of  the
individual  against  unjustified  interferences  by  and  requirements  of  the  state  and
society19. » As such, i.e. as the fundamental value of the constitutional order, human
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dignity  finds  « normative  expression  in  numerous  provisions  of  the  Constitution »,
above all in human rights provisions which protect different aspects of man’s dignity20.
This goes to show, argued the Court, that human dignity is the origin of human rights
and a precondition for respect of other human rights.
13 Later on, in a key part of the decision, the Court proclaimed that respect for human
dignity is a « special constitutional principle » and as such is « directly substantiated in
Article  1  of  the  Constitution,  which  determines  that  Slovenia  is  a  democratic
republic21. » Democracy, further argued the Court, is not merely a formal category – it
is not sufficient that laws and other regulations are adopted in accordance with the
rule of the majority. As a substantive category, the principle of democracy « defines the
Republic of Slovenia as a constitutional democracy, thus as a state in which the acts of
authorities  are  legally  limited  by  constitutional  principles  and  human  rights  and
fundamental freedoms, precisely because individuals and their dignity are at the centre
of its existence and functioning22. » On that basis the Court concluded that the opposing
party  was  wrong  in  arguing  that  the  naming  of  the  street  is  the  right  of  the
democratically elected majority in the municipal council: the principle of democracy
« imposes a duty on all authorities – first of all on those that issue general legal acts –
to respect the boundaries which proceed from the constitutional order whose central
principle is precisely the principle of respect for human dignity, when exercising their
constitutional and statutory powers23. » However, the Court acknowledged that due to
the « substantive openness24 » of the principle of human dignity, the precise limits on
what  public  authorities  may  do,  cannot  be  specified  in  advance  but  are  rather
developed by the Court’s case-law on a case-to-case basis. 
14 Therefore, in the case at hand, the Court had to determine whether the decision of the
municipal  council  to  name  a  street  after  Tito  was  unconstitutional  because  the
symbolic dimension of this act violated the petitioner’s dignity. The Court declared that
« a  regulation  or  other  act  of  the  authorities  which  has  a  symbolic  significance  is
unconstitutional in cases in which such symbol, through the power of the authority,
expresses values which are incompatible with fundamental constitutional values, such
as human dignity, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law25. » Moreover, the Court
also  emphasised  that  since  authorities  must  always  act  in  the  public  interest  and
because « expressing values that are contrary to the fundamental constitutional values
cannot  be  in  the  public  interest,  the  review of  the  constitutionality  of  the  acts  of
authorities is not subject to the principle of proportionality (i.e. weighing between the
public  interest  and the  affected  constitutional  values),  but  such  acts  are  in  and  of
themselves unconstitutional26. » 
15 It follows that the Court had to establish whether the values conveyed by the act i.e. the
municipal  ordinance  were  contrary  to  those  proclaimed  and  protected  by  the
constitutional order. The Court argued that the symbolic dimension of Tito Street « is
inseparably  connected  with  the  symbolic  significance  of  the  name  Josip  Broz  Tito,
Marshal of Yugoslavia and later President for life of the SFRY27. » Unlike the opposing
party, which argued that it named the street after Tito in recognition of his acts that
enabled Slovenia’s liberation from fascist occupation, the Court observed that despite
of these facts, Tito was also a symbol of « the post-war totalitarian regime, which was
marked by extensive and gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms28
[...] » Since the symbolism that Tito’s name emits cannot be divided in such a way that
significance  of  only  one  part  of  the  actions  attributed  to  him  (or  the  regime  he
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symbolizes) could be considered, the Court declared that naming a street after Tito
« can be understood as support not only for him as a historical figure or his individual
actions, but also as support for the entire historical period of his rule and for his rule as
such29. » What the authority’s objective was with the naming is not important: what is
important  is  that  the  naming,  i.e.  the  challenged  ordinance  « must  objectively  be
understood as a form of recognition conferred on the former undemocratic regime30. »
Thereafter, the Court reiterated that authoritative expressions of recognition of the
totalitarian regimes « [are] contrary to promoting respect for human dignity, human
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  and  other  values  which  contemporary  European
constitutional democracies share31. » 
16 On the basis of the reasons stated above, the Court decided that any such new naming
of a street by which the communist totalitarian regime is glorified, is unconstitutional
since it contradicts the principle of respect for human dignity residing in Article 1 of
the Constitution and consequently ruled that the disputed ordinance be annulled.
 
Analysis: the Court’s discourse on human dignity
17 In the following two sections of  the article  the analysis  and critique of  the Court’s
decision  is  presented.  In  order  to  shed  some  light  on  the  doctrinal  origins  and
influences of the Court’s understanding of human dignity, first a very brief and general
account  of  the  German  Constitutional  Court’s  (Bundesverfassungsgericht;  hereinafter
BVerfG) approach to the adjudication of human dignity is given. Later, by looking at
some of its earlier decisions, the Slovenian Constitutional Court’s use of the principle of
human  dignity  leading  up  to  the  Tito  Street case  is  presented.  Finally,  a  two-fold
criticism of the latter decision is provided.
Human dignity adjudication in Germany 
18 It is reasonable to claim that Germany is the cradle of the prevalent modern (Western)
philosophical and legal conceptions of human dignity32. Both are inextricably linked to
Immanuel  Kant’s  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  concept33.  His  view  of
dignity as an inherent, unconditional worth of men informs the perception of dignity
in the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and the practice of the BVerfG. Rosen argues that
« [o]fficially, the fundamental idea motivating the use of dignity in the Grundgesetz » is
the  understanding  of  « dignity  as  intrinsic  value34. »  As  to  its  application,  Walter
demonstrates the various characterisations of the concept in the BVerfG’s case-law: the
Court has declared human dignity as being, above all, « the highest value of the Basic
Law, informing the substance and spirit of the entire document35 »,  as well  as « the
centre  of  the  scheme of  constitutional  values36 »  and,  finally,  as  the  « fundamental
constitutional principle dominating all parts of the constitution37. »
19 From the language of  the constitution’s  Dignity  clause and from the Constitutional
Court’s characterisations, we may observe some of the characteristics of the German
constitutional conception of dignity38. Dignity is perceived as a universal characteristic of
men, an objective feature, one that « requires attribution of rights to the individual
which enable him or her to defend his or her design of life39. » From its position in the
constitutional text, it is seen as a sort of a Grundnorm of the constitutional system, a
norm that is, on the one hand, the source of all constitutional rights, and, on the other
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hand, the source of limitations and (positive) obligations for State organs; moreover, it
serves as the fundamental value of the entire constitutional system and the principal
interpretive tool for the interpretation of the Basic Law40. 
20 One further alleged characteristic of the principle is, however, disputable. It has been
argued that  the  principle  of  human dignity  has  absolute  effect41:  namely,  « that  any
encroachment upon human dignity means a violation42 » and that « [t]he principle of
proportionality does not come into play as long as an intrusion upon human dignity
has been established43. » However, Rosen’s analysis of the BVerfG’s case-law uncovers
an important shift  that often occurs in the Court’s  decision-making.  He shows that
although « the fundamental idea motivating the use of dignity in the Grundgesetz44 » is
the idea of dignity as intrinsic value, « the German courts have often operated on the
assumption that violations of dignity involve treatment that is in some way demeaning
or degrading45 ». But as the following passage from the Court’s Abhörurteil case shows,
not any violation of one’s dignity will amount to an unconstitutional treatment. It that
case, the BVerfG argued:
« Human beings are frequently objects – not just of circumstances and of social
developments, but also of the law, insofar as they must obey it without regard to
their own interests. This is not sufficient for a violation of human dignity. It must
also be the case that they are subjected to treatment that fundamentally calls into
question their quality as subjects, or that treatment in a particular case contains
arbitrary  contempt  for  the  dignity  of  the  human being.  Thus  the  treatment  of
human beings by public authority charged with executing the law, if it is to affront
human dignity, must be an expression of contempt for the value that the human
being  has  in  virtue  of  being  a  person;  it  must,  in  this  sense,  be  ‘disrespectful
treatment’46. »
21 From this short and inevitably superficial overview we may nevertheless deduce two
important conclusions:  First,  that the language both the German and the Slovenian
constitutional courts apply in the human dignity adjudication is highly alike. This leads
to the conclusion that both courts rely on the same underlying conception of human
dignity,  one  based  in  Kant’s  moral  philosophy.  Second,  that  the  same  shift  in  the
underlying conception that Rosen noticed when it comes to German adjudication of
dignity, seems to be present in the Tito Street case as well. The German Constitutional
Court’s  Abhörurteil case  reasoning raises  an important  question:  whether  the act  of
naming  a  street  after  a  person,  whose  name  may  in  some  people  invoke  certain
displeasing feelings, can truly amount to such an encroachment of one’s dignity that it
be seen as contemptful of the very core of one’s worth, offending the very essence of an
individual, and therefore also needed to be declared unconstitutional.
 
The Court’s discourse on human dignity prior to the Tito Street case
22 Highlighting several key decisions, I hereafter present the application of the principle
of  human dignity  established  by  the  Slovenian  Constitutional  Court  in  its  case-law
leading up to the Tito Street decision. 
23 The principle of human dignity features prominently in the Slovenian constitutional
order and in the case-law of the Constitutional Court. The Preamble to the Constitution
invokes  reference  to  the  Basic  Constitutional  Charter  on  the  Sovereignty  and
Independence of the Republic of Slovenia, the document establishing Slovenia as an
independent nation47. The Charter, inter alia, declares that the SFRY did not function as
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a state governed by law, that gross violations of human rights occurred within it and
that  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  will  guarantee  the  protection  of  human  rights  and
fundamental freedoms to all persons in the territory of the Republic. Additionally, the
Preamble  makes  reference  to  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  as  one  of  the
foundations of Slovenian constitutionality. Based on that fact, the Constitutional Court
had in the past declared that the Preamble serves as a tool for the interpretation and
axiological evaluation of the normative elements of the Constitution48. The Court had
also previously made reference to the principle of dignity in connection to Article 1 of
the Constitution, arguing that « [t]he essence of the constitutional provision dealing
with  the separation  of  powers  is  [...]  in  its  fundamental  function  of  protection  of
individual’s freedom and dignity in relation to the government49. »
24 Most of the Court’s case-law on human dignity, however, has been centred on Article 34
of the Constitution which protects the right to personal dignity and security50 i.e. on an
article of the Constitution protecting human dignity as a specific right and not as a
principle.  Within the framework of this article,  the Court made use of the notion of
human dignity to decide various types of cases. For instance, the Court declared that
prevention of performance of work to an employee is an encroachment on his rights
protected under Article 34: « The possibility of professional and personal development,
including achieving and developing status, position and reputation in the working and
living surroundings, together with the undisputed importance of existential security,
are indivisible elements that define the dignity and individuality of any individual51. »
In another case, the Court decided that taking away all of a convicted person’s financial
assets for enforcing a civil claim against him would violate that individual’s right to
personal dignity as well as his right to social security52. Moreover, the right to personal
dignity had also been associated with the right to privacy53, right to honour and good
reputation54, and other constitutional rights and principles.
25 A  number  of  the  Court’s  decisions  directly  address  the  issue  of  human  dignity
violations  under  the  previous  regime.  In  the  early  1990’s,  directly  following  the
independence,  the Court issued several decisions in which it  elaborated its position
with regard to the former political system. In the aforementioned case U-I-158/94, the
Court stated that
« the former Yugoslav system of constitution and government institutions [...] did
not put in the first place human rights and did not define clear legal restrictions
applying to the government authorities and their violence. Thus, it made possible
arbitrary government, and its constitution was not a legal instrument in the full
sense as understood by modern European civilization. » 
26 In  contrast,  the  most  important  direct  objective  of  the  new  Constitution  is  « the
protection  of  fundamental  human  rights  and  freedoms  of  every  person  here  and
now55. » 
27 Elsewhere, the Court argued that those living in the former communist regime were
exposed to  permanent  and systematic  violations  of  human rights  and fundamental
freedoms and were deprived of enjoying such rights as freedom of expression, right of
political association, right of free enterprise etc.56 The Court also established that after
the  end  of  World  War  II,  the  authorities  « carried  out  mass  executions  of  former
military and current political opponents, legally unacceptable trials followed by death
penalties, illegal seizure of property, obstruction and liquidation of political parties in
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violation of its own legal system etc., thus making the injured parties afraid, with good
reason, for their lives in case of residing in such a country57. »
28 This inquiry into the Court’s decisions dealing with dignity enables us to make a few
important observations. First, the Court views human rights as one of the pillars of
Slovenian constitutionality and has established that the Preamble, which articulates
this commitment, is an important tool of constitutional interpretation and axiological
evaluation.  Second,  the  Court  had,  prior  to  the  Tito  Street case,  already  invoked  a
connection between the principle of human dignity and Article 1 of the Constitution,
but it did so by arguing that the principle of separation of powers is designed to, inter
alia, protect individuals’ dignity (as a right) and not, as it did in the Tito Street decision,
by introducing the principle of  human dignity as an essential  element of democratic
rule. Third, human dignity has served the Court as a basis for deliberation in a variety
of cases, but always either in connection to some other right or principle or in the form
of a specific constitutional provision protecting some aspect of the broader principle.
Finally,  in  a  series  of  decisions  from  the  early  1990’s,  the  Court  positioned  itself
strongly in opposition to the previous socialist regime, articulating the legal, political
and axiological discontinuity from the former system. These characteristics therefore
represent  the  Courts  axiological  and  legal  premises  with  regard  to  human  dignity
adjudication and serve to elucidate the Court’s reasoning in the Tito Street decision.
 
A two-fold criticism of the decision
29 In the final part of this paper I focus on presenting several instances in the Court’s
reasoning that I  find disputable.  My critique of the decision is in two parts.  First,  I
discuss two instances in which the Court attempted to present its particular view of
dignity as « objective ». Finally, I show that two main characterisations of the human
dignity’s  role  in  the constitutional  system, which represent  the core of  the Court’s
reasoning, conflict with each other and cause the decision to lack internal coherence.
 
First criticism: Objectification
30 McCrudden notes that  jurisdictions differ  on « whether dignity is  to  be interpreted
from the point of view of the victim or ‘objectively’58. » Both approaches pose certain
problems: 
« On the one hand, for the court to say that the appropriate approach is to adopt a
particular individual’s own judgment on what seems to breach his or her dignity is
to risk putting in place an unmanageable and unworkable standard. On the other
hand,  adopting  an  entirely  court-centred  view  of  what  constitutes  a  breach  of
dignity seems patronizing59. » 
31 McCrudden then shows that some courts adopt a mixed subjective-objective approach.
This  approach,  according to the Canadian Court  of  Appeal  for  Ontario,  « requires a
court to consider the individual’s or group’s traits, history, and circumstances in order
to evaluate  whether  a  reasonable  person,  in  circumstances  similar  to  the claimant,
would find that the impugned law differentiates in a manner which demeans his or her
dignity60. »  But  as  McCrudden  warns,  in  my  opinion  rightly,  « this  hardly  seems  a
particularly stable approach, and in practice has sometimes led to courts adopting what
seems like an almost entirely objective approach, where the court effectively imposes
its own views61 [...] » Therefore, an objective approach to the interpretation of human
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dignity, regardless of the reasons for its use or the manner in which it is presented,
allows, above all, for the introduction of judicial voluntarism and is therefore an ill-
suited approach to dignity adjudication62. 
32 There are two important instances in the Tito Street decision in which we may observe
that the Court attempted to vest its  opinion in the cloak of objectivity.  In the first
instance, the Court claimed that as the fundamental value which permeates the entire
legal order, dignity « has an objective significance in the functioning of authority not
only  in  individual  proceedings  but  also  when  adopting  regulations63. »  Public
authorities are thus bound to protect the inherent worth of  the individual  in their
activities. Now, if this directive were to serve as the major premise in the decision-
making of public officials (even if  as a ‘meta’  major premise),  the principle of legal
foreseeability requires that the content of the obligations of public authorities be, to
the greatest possible extent, determined in advance, so to allow for their adoption in
the  daily  decision-making  of  officials.  However,  if  we  again  observe  the  Court’s
acknowledgment in Paragraph 11 of the decision, that « a firm and complete a priori
definition of human dignity is not possible » and that furthermore « boundaries of the
admissible  conduct  of  state  authorities  are  developed through the  decisions  of  the
courts  and  the  Constitutional  Court,  which  take  into  consideration  the  specific
circumstances  of  individual  cases »,  we  see  that  an  ex  ante determination  of  what
actions of authoritative bodies are consistent with the principle of respect for human
dignity  is  nearly  impossible64.  Consequently,  foreseeability  of  what  is  legally
permissible is greatly diminished if not entirely eliminated.
33 The second instance in which we can observe the Court’s attempt to project an image of
objectivity  is  even  more  problematic  for  the  perception  of  the  final  decision’s
argumentative quality.  In deciding whether the naming of the street after Tito was
consistent with the principle of respect for human dignity, the Court emphasised that
its goal in doing that was neither to review « the personality and individual actions of
Josip Broz Tito » nor to conduct a « historical review of facts and circumstances65. » As
the guardians of the Constitution and the values on which it is based, their sole task
was to « establish constitutionally important circumstances taking into consideration
the constitutional order in force and on such basis decide on the constitutionality of
the challenged regulation66. » But arguably, contrary to the declared, the Court had in
fact undertaken an evaluation of the historical facts as well as of Tito’s personality and
his actions. This much is evident from Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Court’s decision67.
This discrepancy in the Court’s actions was noted among commentators of the decision.
On the one hand, Šturm argues that it is an imminent task of constitutional review –
 when there is a meaningful connection with the subject of review – to take a position
with regard to the historically attested violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms which have occurred in the former totalitarian system68.  Furthermore, the
author  claims  that  constitutional  adjudication  plays  an  indispensable  role  in  the
process of transforming post-totalitarian social order into a system of constitutional
democracy with a free democratic society69. Avbelj, from a different point of view and
criticising  the  Court’s  methodological  approach,  reaches  a  similar  conclusion.  He
argues: 
« I wonder how the Constitutional Court can determine that the name Josip Broz
Tito  is  axiologically  incompatible  with  the  current  Constitution  without  first
assessing his historical role. How can someone determine that the meaning of a
symbol  is  ‘objectively’  incompatible  with  the  new  constitutional  order,  without
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having previously adopted an appropriate interpretation of the overall historical
characteristics of the person whose name today cannot be used even for symbolical
purposes? This,  from the epistemological-hermeneutical  point of  view, is  simply
impossible. The assessment that a name is symbolically abject simply must be based
on  an  interpretive  assessment  of  the  historical  actions  of  that  person  and  the
quality of the state, head of which that person was. If that assessment is objective,
as it is claimed, that could only mean that it is widely intersubjectively accepted. In
the social  world  there  is  no  ‘neutral’  depersonalized objectivity  in  the  sense  of
natural sciences70. » 
34 The author concludes by saying that the position that the Court should base its decision
only on the constitutional assessment and not on the interpretation and evaluation of
facts and circumstances of that historical period is not only wrong from the point of
view  of  constitutional  argumentation  but  also  epistemologically-hermeneutically
unfeasible. « If it were to follow it, the Constitutional Court would not be able to issue
this  decision  for  it  would  lack  one  of  the  two  premises  needed  for  the  final  [...]
syllogistic conclusion71. » While both seem to agree that the Court has every right, and
indeed, when circumstances call for it, a duty to engage in an (axiological) evaluation of
historical  facts,  Avbelj’s  analysis  demonstrates  that  an  attempt  to  conceal  such  an
assessment is not just unnecessary, but rather methodologically inappropriate, even all
together inappropriate.
 
Second criticism: Lack of coherence
35 Coherence of legal reasoning is « an elementary postulate of rationality72 », the latter
being one of the fundamental characteristics of contemporary law73. In the context of
judicial reasoning, especially at the level of constitutional adjudication, its importance
is even more accentuated. As Bertea notes, though there is « wide agreement [...] over
the characterisation of coherence in the negative as lack of inconsistencies74 », as to the
positive characterisation, there is much more controversy. Nevertheless, the minimum
condition seems to  be  that  propositions  be  logically  consistent75.  It  is  claimed that
additionally, coherence should at least entail « comprehensiveness and completeness
(at least to some degree), support (of varying scope and force), and cross-connection
and mutual justification between the parts of a whole76. » Aware of the limitations of
arguing from the argument of coherence77, I nevertheless wish to claim that the Court’s
reasoning in the Tito Street case lacks internal coherence. I take this to mean the lack of
semantic consistency in the Court’s characterization of the concept of human dignity –
 when used as the central argument upon which it based its decision.
36 Let us observe the disputed characterisations.  In Paragraph 4,  the Court determines
that « human dignity [is] the fundamental value and legal starting point of Slovenian
democracy. » Later on, in Paragraph 6, it seems to further develop this interpretation,
saying  that  « [r]espect  for  human  dignity  is  the  legal-ethical  foundation  of
contemporary states based on the concept of constitutional democracy ». In these two
passages the Court establishes human dignity as a meta-constitutional principle upon
which the entire constitutional system rests. Let us name this conception A. However, in
Paragraph 10 the following claim is made: « As a special constitutional principle, the
principle  for  respect  for  human dignity  is  directly  substantiated in  Article 1  of  the
Constitution, which determines that Slovenia is a democratic republic. » Here, human
dignity is perceived as (just) an element of the principle of democracy. Let us call this
conception B.  Immediately we notice that  conception A (human dignity as  the meta-
Human Dignity in the Discourse of the Slovenian Constitutional Court
La Revue des droits de l’homme, 4 | 2013
10
constitutional principle) is substantially different from conception B (human dignity as
an element of the principle of democracy). While in Paragraphs 4 and 6 the Court views
dignity as the supreme legal and axiological principle of the legal and political system,
in Paragraph 10 it  reduces it  to a principle that is  derivative from the principle of
democracy.  Furthermore,  in  the  same  Paragraph 10,  the  Court  offers  another
characterisation of the principle,  one that again seems in line with conception A. It
states: « the principle of democracy substantively defines the Republic of Slovenia as a
constitutional democracy, thus as a state in which the acts of authorities are legally
limited  by  constitutional  principles  and  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,
precisely because individuals and their dignity are at the centre of its existence and
functioning. » Clearly, conceptions A and B are at odds with each other. If dignity is the
starting  point  of  Slovenian  democracy  which  is  substantively  characterised  as  a
constitutional democracy78 – thus being axiologically and normatively superior to the
principle of democracy, we find that conception B is inconsistent with conception A:
dignity  cannot  derive  from  the  principle  of  democracy  if  it  is  superior  to  it.  This
discrepancy is not to be taken too lightly since we recall that it was conception B that
was the interpretation of the principle of dignity on which the Court based its ruling
on. If, for the argument’s sake, we take it that this latter interpretation of the principle
is the one the Court intended to enforce, we are left with the problem of determining
what precise legal power, if any, the Court intended to confer to conception A. In this
case, it seems that human dignity is can’t be perceived as the highest and fundamental
value of the constitutional system. If,  on the other hand, it  is the view that human
dignity serves as the supreme principle of the constitutional system that is the one the
Court wished to implement, then the opposite characterisation of the principle must be
seen as weaker in strength and must thus yield to the former one. In that case, we are
then faced with a decisional basis for the Court’s decision that cannot be sustained. In
consequence, the Court’s conclusion lacks its major premise.
37 From the  stated  above,  it  can  therefore  be  concluded  that  the  two  conceptions  of
dignity that the Court presented in the Tito Street case are mutually exclusive, making
the decision as a whole, internally incoherent.
 
Concluding remarks
38 Symbols  carry  multiple  meanings.  This  applies  for  those  associated  with  (former)
totalitarian regimes as well.  The meanings these symbols convey are often radically
different. In the Tito Street case, the Slovenian Constitutional Court concluded that if a
symbol can objectively be understood as promoting values incompatible with the values
that the constitutional system in effect promotes and protects, then that symbol must
be banned – regardless of the fact that some of the meanings of the symbol may be
consistent with the constitutional system in force. As we’ve seen, the idea that a symbol
has a single objective meaning is misplaced. This is further evidenced by the approach
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case Vajnai v. Hungary79,
where the ECtHR emphasised that a totalitarian symbol – in that case a five-pointed red
star – also symbolizes certain other ideas and that « only by a careful examination of the
context in which the offending words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction
between [...] language which is protected by Article 10 and that which forfeits its right
to tolerance in a democratic society80. » Moreover, the ECtHR emphasised that a ban on
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certain behaviour can also encompass activities and ideas that are protected by the
Convention since « there is no satisfactory way to sever the different meanings of the
incriminated symbol81. » Though it should be noted that the circumstances of the Vajnai
case differed from those in the Tito Street case – namely, in Vajnai the actions of an
individual and not of public authorities were contested82 –, the approach of the ECtHR,
emphasising the importance of a comprehensive examination of all relevant contextual
circumstances  and  of  the  need  to  accommodate  for  the  different  possible
interpretations  of  a  disputed  symbol,  seems  more  in  line  with  the  pluralistic  and
harmonisational tendencies of modern constitutional democracies. A similar approach,
mutatis mutandis, would therefore seem to be more appropriate in the Tito Street case as
well.
39 This brings us to one final criticism of the Court’s decision. If we accept the Court’s
reasoning that, first, the naming of a street has direct legal effect with regard to all who
encounter or apprehend it and that, second, due to the axiological and legal weight of
the  principle  of  human  dignity,  any  encroachment  upon  the  principle  by  public
authorities is deemed unconstitutional, then the Court’s proclamation that only a new
naming,  i.e.  a  naming  occurring  after  the  establishment  of  the  new  democratic
constitutional order, is unconstitutional, seems questionable83. If mere apprehension of
such a name encroaches upon one’s dignity – even though, as seen from the BVerfG
Abhörurteil case, this notion is indeed hard to sustain –, then the time when such an act
of  public  authorities  occurred  should  not  be  a  determining  factor  in  the  Court’s
decision. Rather, the time of the effects on the individual of apprehending such a name
should  be  relevant  in  determining  whether  one’s  dignity  was  encroached upon.  If
public authorities have a negative obligation to refrain from acts that encroach upon
one’s dignity,  surely they also have a positive obligation to prevent such violations
from occurring. If, therefore, they must refrain from giving rise to affronts to human
dignity by naming streets (and other public facilities) after those who symbolise the
former totalitarian regime, surely they have an obligation to remove all existing names
making reference to Tito and others who symbolise the former regime. In light of the
Court’s  overall  argumentation it  is  therefore  difficult  to  see  how human dignity  of
individuals is not violated in any and all cases in which the naming of streets or squares
after Josip Broz Tito had been made in the past and persists still today. But according to
the Court’s reasoning, exposure to such symbols does not amount to a violation of the
principle of human dignity. Thus, the Court seems to have established a temporally
limited scope of the principle of human dignity: the principle which is supposed to be
the  bedrock  of  the  entire  constitutional  system.  All  things  considered,  such
argumentation is unconvincing.
40 Regardless of these problems, the Tito Street case carries significant precedential value,
for it marks the first instance in which the principle of human dignity served as the
sole basis for the Court’s decision. However, if the criticisms I have presented here are
convincing,  we  can  argue  that  the  Court’s  attempt  at  defining  the  principle  and
determining its role in the constitutional system, is marked by important conceptual
lapses  and  argumentative  confusions.  This  is  most  evident  in  the  attempt  to
incorporate  the  principle  of  human  dignity  within  the  ambit  of  Article  1  of  the
Constitution. Due to the fact that it was precisely this argument that served as the basis
of the Court’s decision, a strong reservation about its overall argumentative quality is
in order. 
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ABSTRACTS
The  article  examines  the  Slovenian  Constitutional  Court’s  understanding  of  the  principle  of
human dignity. It focuses on a recent case of that Court in which human dignity was for the first
time  employed  as  an  independent  principle  of  adjudication.  The  case  concerned  an  alleged
violation of the principle of human dignity by an act of naming a street after the former Yugoslav
president Josip Broz Tito. After a detailed examination of the decision, the article explores the
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Court’s  application  of  the  principle  prior  to  this  verdict.  Finally,  a  two-fold  criticism of  the
Court’s reasoning in the Tito Street case is presented. The central objection argues that different
characterisations of the principle of human dignity and of its role in the constitutional system
contradict each other, making the final decision’s coherence questionable.
L’article se propose d’étudier la façon dont la Cour constitutionnelle de Slovénie comprend le
principe de dignité. Pour ce faire, il prend pour exemple une récente décision de la Cour dans
laquelle la dignité humaine a été employée pour la première fois comme fondement juridique
indépendant du contrôle de constitutionnalité. La décision portait sur l’allégation de la violation
du principe de dignité humaine en ce qu’il devait être donné à une rue le nom de l’ex-Président
de la Yougoslavie “Josip Broz Tito”. Après un examen détaillé des circonstances de la décision,
l’article examine la façon dont la Cour applique le principe. Il propose pour finir deux types de
critiques qui peuvent être adressées au raisonnement de la Cour dans cette décision Tito Street.
Les objections centrales reposent sur les différentes approches du principe de dignité proposées
par la Cour, sur la fonction contradictoire du principe au sein du système constitutionnel et sur
la cohérence de la décision adoptée.
El artículo propone estudiar la manera a través de la cual el Tribunal constitucional de Eslovenia
entiende  al  principio  de  dignidad.  Para  tal  fin,  se  toma  como  ejemplo  a  una  decisión
recientemente emitida por el Tribunal en la cual, la dignidad humana es empleada por primera
vez como fundamento jurídico independiente del control de constitucionalidad. La decisión trata
sobre el alegato de violación del principio de dignidad humana por cuanto se debía dar a una
calle el nombre del ex presidente de Yugoslavia “Josip Broz Tito”. Luego de un examen detallado
sobre las circunstancias de la decisión, el artículo examina la forma a través de la cual el Tribunal
aplica dicho principio. Se proponen, para terminar, dos tipos de crítica que pueden ser dirigidas
contra el  razonamiento del  Tribunal  en esta decisión Tito Street.  Las objeciones centrales ce
basan en los diferentes enfoques del principio de dignidad que el Tribunal propuso, en la función
contradictoria de dicho principio en el seno del sistema constitucional y en la coherencia de la
decisión adoptada.
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Mots-clés: principe de dignité humaine, droits de l’homme, symboles (totalitaires), contrôle de
constitutionnalité, Cour constitutionnelle de la République Slovène
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